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Introduction 
Efficiency driven managerial reforms dominate the political agenda and practice throughout Europe 
(Steyvers et al 2008). This contemporary logic of organizing in western local government has been 
referred to as New Public Management (NPM). It is seen as the wave of restructuring governmental 
organizations with businesslike instruments and styles during the last decades (Hood 1991, 1995, 
Windels 2006). NPM is regarded as a toolbox from which individual tools are taken to solve current 
problems. The modernization does not only affect administration, restructurings also encompass 
political institutions and ways of organizing politics and public decision- and policymaking (Hansen 
2001). NPM not solely advocates administrative innovation, it also aims to make the responsible political 
leaders much more businesslike, i.e. market-, performance-, cost-, efficiency-, output- and audit- 
oriented (Bochel & Bochel 2010, Diefenbach 2009, Pina et al. 2009, Wolmann 2012).  
As a consequence, reformers undertook various initiatives to sensitize politicians for the NPM ideas 
(Schedler 2003). They understood that in order to successfully put the reform ideas into practice, strong 
support from politicians was necessary (Lapsley & Pallot 2000, Schedler 2003, Bochel & Bochel 2010, 
Anessi-Pessina et al. 2008). Their support and attention for NPM concepts and tools gave “political 
weight” to the NPM discourse and played an important role in integrating them in decision-making (Tat 
Kei Ho 2005). Following the NPM doctrine this meant that politicians had to be willing to modify their 
behaviour and support processes of decision-making with rational, objective and focused information 
using private sector techniques (Windels 2006).  
However, it seems that reforms did not always achieve the expected change in politicians’ behaviour 
(Lapsley 2000). Already in the early days of their implementation, some scholars warned for unintended 
developments and significant gaps between expected and actual changes (Anessi-Pessina et al. 2008). 
Although many governmental documents and speeches have claimed a shift towards a businesslike 
model and attitude, closer empirical study showed that there had actually been high continuity between 
the old and the new (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2000).  
“The gap between rhetorics and actions is so wide to provoke scepticism or, according to taste, 
cynicism” (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2000).  
Due to the closeness of local politicians to policymaking- and implementation and the fact that they had 
to be willing to implement the NPM reforms from the floor (in contrast with for example national 
politicians working within a framework and from a certain distance), these gaps between the intended 
and the actual outcomes of the reforms were particularly visible at the local level.  
Obstacles between politicians and the NPM idea 
Firstly, some authors identify 'the lack of understanding for political processes and decision-making’ as 
the most fundamental problem of the NPM ideology. The unpredictable nature of political decision-
making and its sensitivity to external pressure are criticised as irrational and inefficient from this NPM 
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logic. However, local governments are democratic political institutions, organizing public and common 
services for the citizens of the municipality. Politicians are the elected representatives of the plurality of 
opinions and interests of the citizens. (Hansen 2001). They carefully watch the common concerns and 
affairs of the municipality. Their role is to comprehend a subject matter from different points of view, to 
consider it, to compromise conflicting interests and judge what is most reasonable and appropriate in a 
given situation. This genuine political and democratic dimension of the role and skills of elected 
councillors is not easily combined with the propagated idea of rational and efficient decision-making 
(Hansen 2001). NPM’s concept of efficiency is grounded in economics. However, this ‘economic 
efficiency’ is clearly not easily matched with ‘political efficiency’- a concept that focuses on the efforts 
needed to attract voters in elections (ter Bogt 2004, Yetano 2009). 
Secondly, NPM advocates a clear and distinct separation between ‘politics and administration’. 
However, historically and constitutionally such a distinction and separation of political versus 
administrative competence and decision making was not instituted as part of local government 
structure. The local council has, as an elected assembly of representatives and ombudsmen of the 
citizens, always been granted complete political as well as administrative competence and responsibility 
to handle local affairs (Steyvers et al. 2006). The study of Steyvers et al (2006) showed that more than 
half of the mayors (fully) disagreed with the idea that politicians should define objectives and control 
output but never intervene in the task fulfilment of the local administration. Support for this role 
distinction among Belgian mayors thus seems rather limited.  
Notwithstanding these fundamental reasons for scepticism towards politicians’ absorption of the NPM 
discourse, we still lack systematic empirical evidence. Many studies show that it is still not clear today 
exactly how much of the ‘NPM story’ has been absorbed in reality by politicians all over the world 
(Schedler 2003, Askim 2007). Moreover, besides the already mentioned fundamental obstacles, other, 
more individual factors could also affect politicians’ adoption of the NPM ideas and instruments. 
A weak spot in research 
Research has provided far less knowledge about politicians’ than about managers’ experiences with  
NPM concepts and tools. Moreover, it is not evident that findings apply to politicians as they conduct 
their work in very different ways (Askim 2008, Lee 2008, Liguori et al. 2009).  
In general, political and social scientists show a certain restraint to study management concepts. They 
rather stress the individual profile of councillors, (Steyvers et al. 2006, Guérin & Kerrouche 2008, 
Verhelst et al. 2011). Vice versa, apart from a few notable exceptions (authors such as Askim 2007, 
2008, ter Bogt, 2004) politicians are an undervalued group in economic research.   
Most evidence on politicians’ knowledge of NPM is rather anecdotal and stems from case studies taking 
a qualitative approach (Guérin & Kerrouche 2008, Verhelst et al. 2011). They have provided valuable 
insight and interesting hypotheses but little systematic evidence (Askim 2007, Steyvers et al. 2006, 
Verhelst et al. 2011). Several of these studies have addressed the more 'technical' aspects of NPM 
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Reforms. Subsequently, a lot of research has been conducted into promises, usefulness and potential 
of instruments such as the Balanced Score Card, competitive tendering, performance measurement, 
performance related pay, ….  
Executive politicians, such as mayors, are very often the research subject. Because of their more 
operational and executive involvement, their adoption of NPM could be different. To our knowledge  
only few studies focused on councillors and they do not consider the party leaders in the council as a 
separate group (Askim 2007). However, party leaders are key members of the council, the so called 
front benchers between the councillors (Askim 2007, Bochel & Bochel 2010). Their position provides 
room for strong minded individuals to exploit their role if they choose so (Bochel & Bochel 2010). 
Because of their closeness to the NPM reforms, councillors, and especially the party leaders can be 
considered as key political NPM protagonists within their local government (Bochel & Bochel 2010, 
Brugué & Vallès 2005). Their acquaintanceship with NPM concepts may be used as a relevant indicator 
for the extent to which the NPM discourse is absorbed by politicians. 
Contribution 
The contribution of this paper is threefold: 
Firstly, this paper draws on different theoretical and empirical insights from accounting, political and 
public administration and -management literature. This combination of different dimensions, is rather 
innovative.  
Secondly, except for some rather exploratory research attempts, it has not yet been made clear to what 
extent the NPM ideology has been absorbed by councillors, nor by which factors this is affected (Tat Kei 
Ho 2005, Schedler 2003).The article sets a state of the art of the extent to which (‘how much’) party 
leaders are acquainted with NPM tools and instruments in Flemish municipal councils. It is intended as 
a quantitative complement for the existing findings of qualitative research. 
Thirdly, it intends to reveal whether factors such as businesslike experience, education or multiple office 
holding can explain party leaders’ differences in degree of acquaintanceship with NPM instruments and 
tools.  
Research question 
The aim of this paper is both to disclose the NPM acquaintanceship of local councillors, by focusing on 
party leaders in the closed environment of the local council and  to identify the factors that determine 
their knowledge of different NPM concepts in Flemish municipalities. The analysis is certainly not 
intended as an evaluation of party leaders’ knowledge in terms of success or failure. The first research 
question sets a state of the art on the extent to which party leaders in Flemish councils are acquainted 
with applied NPM concepts. 
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The second research question relates to the determining factors that may impact on party leaders’ 
acquaintanceship with NPM. 
RQ 2A -Does their acquaintanceship with NPM differ depending on council party leaders’ political 
experience ? 
RQ 2B -Does their acquaintanceship with NPM differ according to their formal political role, whether 
opposition or majority members?  
RQ 2C -Does their acquaintanceship with NPM differ depending on their professional background ? 
RQ 2D -Does their acquaintanceship with NPM differ according to their political mandate, whether 
combining different mandates or not? 
RQ 2E -Does their acquaintanceship with NPM differ according to their education, whether economically 
educated or not? 
Hypotheses 
1. Experience has a positive or negative effect on the acquaintanceship with NPM 
Councillors are in general increasingly highly educated and involved in local politics for a greater length 
of time (Guérin & Kerrouche 2008). However, research is inconclusive about the impact of politicians’ 
experience on the adoption of NPM ideas. Some argue that highly experienced politicians have good 
abilities to interpret information and make use of new instruments because they are more efficient 
readers of documents. Due to their superior information knowledge of their polity’s history they can 
more efficiently interpret information. In contrast, Melkers & Willoughby (2005) found that specifically 
performance information use decreased with experience. Inexperienced councillors were more 
receptive and more insecure than political veterans. De Groot et al. (2010) confirm this two rival 
suppositions, more experienced members tend to be more open-minded, but long-tenured members 
rely on routine and familiar information sources. 
2. Formal political roles (opposition) positively influence the acquaintanceship with NPM 
We suppose that the individual party leaders decide in terms of political advantages and consensus 
(Liguori 2010, Johansson & Siverbo 2009 ). This means that leaders of the opposition make more use 
of negative information, in order to damage the majority. Askim (2008) found that backbenchers and 
politicians in opposition made more use of performance information than frontbenchers and politicians 
representing parties in power. Although his findings relate to use of a specific type of (quantitative) 
information, they could also point at more openness towards businesslike thinking from opposition 
members. 
3. Professional use of financial information increases their acquaintanceship with NPM 
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Due to the generally limited economic training of politicians, the specific professional or businesslike 
background of party leaders might be relevant (Brusca 1997). The use of financial information for 
professional reasons indicates a more businesslike attitude and a certain predisposition for control and 
monitoring instruments and is thus expected to exert a positive effect on the acquaintanceship with the 
NPM idea.  
4. Combination of different political mandates increases their acquaintanceship with NPM 
Candidates for elections are becoming younger, but they are being mobilized more often. This means 
that multiple office holding occurs more frequently (Weekers et al. 2007). Politicians combining different 
mandates are indeed more experienced. Due to their broad network within and outside the political 
body, they are assumed to be better positioned to interpret unfamiliar information or work with new 
instruments (Askim 2008). As other governments are also subject to NPM reforms, they might have an 
information advantage and a superior knowledge of NPM related tools. 
5. Education in economy enhances their acquaintanceship with NPM 
Councillors are in general increasingly highly educated (Guérin & Kerrouche 2008). However, there is 
disagreement in literature concerning the influence of education in general on the adoption of NPM. The 
explanation usually offered is that people with advanced degrees and training are skilled at handling 
large amounts of formal, numerical or technical information, often generated as result of NPM inspired 
reforms. But Askim (2008) found that in the specific case of performance information utilization was 
lowest among the best educated councillors because they only looked up performance information 
when they were unsure what to do, the best educated already possessed the knowledge needed to 
make decisions (Askim 2008). However, in the NPM logic, politicians should be able to respond to, 
interpret, comply with, or challenge financial information (Guthrie et al. 1999). As a consequence, 
reformers undertook many initiatives to provide local politicians the necessary quantitative and financial 
information for efficient decision-making (Lapsley 1999, Askim 2007, Yetano 2009, Leroy 2011)  
Therefore, we argue that a specific economic education enhances financial, analytical and strategic 
skills, very relevant for the adoption of NPM ideas. 
Empirical setting  
Flanders counts 308 municipalities, covering between 80 and 480.000 inhabitants. They hold a threefold 
structure with a council, an executive and a mayor. The council is chosen through direct elections every 
six years. Dependent on the number of inhabitants, they count between 7 and 55 members. Most 
Flemish councillors have ordinary jobs and are only part-time politicians. The local councillor without an 
executive mandate spends on average 7.63 hours per week on his task as councillor and this for a very 
limited monetary compensation (Reynaert et al. 2010). 29% of the Flemish councils is chaired by a 
councillor, in 68 % it is still the mayor and in 4% it is an alderman. Multiple office holding is a frequent 
phenomenon in Belgian politics. During the 2007 Belgian federal elections, only half of the candidates 
were new. Of the 113 elected federal MP’s in 2010, 59% held another political mandate, of which 40,7% 
municipal councillors. In the Flemish regional parliament this is even more manifest; of the 124 
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members, 107 combined a local mandate, of which 50% members of council (Weekers et al. 2007). The 
members of the executive (the College of Mayor and Aldermen) are elected by and among the council 
members, mostly as a result of a coalition agreement. About 70 % of all municipalities are coalition 
governments. The College consists of 2 to 10 members, they are in charge of day-to-day management 
and are presided by the mayor who actually is the real leader at local level (Goeminne et al. 2008, 
Valcke 2009). Local power (nearly) completely rests in the hands of the parties holding a majority 
position in the local council. 
As elsewhere in Western Europe, Flemish municipalities have undergone a major change in various 
aspects of their organization (Windels 2006). Fitting in with the rise of NPM, the Local Government Act 
of 2006 (in Dutch “Gemeentedecreet) was focused on a more businesslike and professionalized 
management of local government. The reform introduced new policy instruments with regard to financial 
management, control, audit, human resources and result oriented policy planning and evaluation. 
Because the Flemish Local Government Act is essentially mandatory, the context in which local council 
party leaders operate is largely homogeneous. Flemish municipalities share common political and 
institutional systems, experience the same economic shocks, employ similar budgetary processes and 
have identical electoral rules. 
Data collection and research method 
Between 18/12/2011 and 05/02/2012 an online survey was conducted among party leaders in a 
stratified sample of 125 Flemish municipal councils. After one week a reminder was sent, bringing the 
response rate to a very satisfying 68% (total surveys sent out : 529, with 389 responses and after 
elimination of incomplete answers leading to 363 valid questionnaires). The questionnaire was 
pretested in a small pilot study with some field experts. 
Methodology 
The NPM acquaintanceship score 
We assume that party leaders well acquainted with NPM instruments are more convinced of the 
usefulness and relevance of the NPM inspired reforms (Anessi-Pessina et al. 2008). As a consequence, 
their NPM acquaintanceship ‘degree’ might be used as a good indicator to assess their absorption of 
the NPM idea. 
Firstly, to assess party leaders’ NPM acquaintanceship, we measured their familiarity with a selection of 
five concepts (municipal management team, management control and policy cycle, internal control, 
autonomization and budget ownership) that represent the implementation of NPM in Flemish 
municipalities (Leroy 2011). Figure 1 illustrates the NPM paradigm as conceptualized by Hood (1995) 
and the corresponding concept from the Flemish local government act. We could call it the ‘applied part 
of NPM’. This construct was pretested with field experts.   
Figure 1: elements of the NPM_acquaintanceship_score 
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NPM Doctrine (Hood 1991, 1995) 5 Applied concepts in Flemish Local Government (2006) 
 
Shift to disaggregation of units in the public 
sector, decentralisation 
1)Autonomization (creation of separate quasi 
autonomous separate units around products or service 
delivery) 
Visible hands-on management, delegation 
of budgets, more discretionary power for 
management and clear assignment of 
responsibilities 
2) Budget ownership  
3) Municipal management team  
Explicit standards and measures of 
performance and stress on private sector 
styles and management practice, private 
sector accounting norms, clear statements 
of goals, ‘hard look’ at objectives, stress on 
results rather than procedures, changing 
financial reporting systems, performance 
measurement approach, changes to internal 
and external public sector audits 
4) Internal control and audit,  
5) New management control and policy cycle (‘BBC’ 
in Dutch) 
 
Secondly, the NPM_acquaintanceship_score is used as dependent variable to perform a linear 
regression analysis to assess the impact of various determinants as hypothesized earlier. 
Analyses and results (to be completed) 
1. Descriptives on local party leaders 
Figure 2 
Descriptive Statistics local party leaders N 363 
      
    
Minimum Maximum Mean 
AGE  
  27 78 50,76 
EXPERIENCE (years in 
council) 
  0,1 41 12,00 
  
  
Frequency Percent 
  

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
 
Figure 2 shows that the average party leader in the municipal council is male, 50 years old and has 
been member of the council for two terms. He has in general a higher education and exercises an 
independent profession or works as an executive. The large majority of the party leaders are not 
SEX male 274 75,50%   
  female 89 24,50%   
        
OPPOSITION/MAJORITY opposition 202 55,60%   
  majority 161 44,40%   
        
PROFESSION occupation:none 71 19,60%   
  independent profession 76 20,90%   
  worker/labourer 13 3,60%   
  office worker/executive 108 29,80%   
  public servant/teacher 65 17,90%   
  full time politician 15 4,10%   
  party-cabinets employee 15 4,10%   
  
        
        
EDUCATION primary education 7 1,90%   
  lower secondary education 26 7,20%   
  higher secondary education 86 23,70%   
  professional bachelor 103 28,40%   
  academic master/bachelor 133 36,60%   
  phd 8 2,20%   
  
  
EDUCATION_ECONOMY NO 280 77,10%   
  YES 83 22,90%   
        
CUMUL none 326 89,80%   
  european parlement 1 0,30%   
  federal parlement 4 1,10%   
  senate 3 0,80%   
  regional parlement 3 0,80%   
  province 11 3%   
  local executive mandate 15 4,10%   
          
PARTY Open VLD 73 20,10%   
  CD&V (+N-VA) 88 24,20%   
  Vlaams Belang 47 12,90%   
  SPa (+Spirit) 68 18,70%   
  Groen 26 7,20%   
  N-VA 15 4,10%   
  Local party 46 12,70%   
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combining different political mandates, which suggests that mostly mayors or aldermen or other 
councillors combine a double mandate. All Flemish political parties are more or less proportionally 
represented in the sample. 
2. Descriptives on the NPM_acquaintanceship_ score:  
To answer the first research question ‘to what extent are party leaders acquainted with applied NPM 
concepts in Flemish municipalities, the survey asked party leaders to rate the extent to which they were 
familiar (acquainted with) the 5 NPM related elements. Figure 3 brings an overview. 
Figure 3 
Descriptives dependent variable N= 363         
    
Minimum Maximum Mean 
Acquaintanceship_management_team   1 5 3,28 
Acquaintanceship _Internal_Control   0 5 2,69 
Acquaintanceship _budgetownership   0 5 2,91 
Acquaintanceship _mgt_control   0 5 2,62 
Acquaintanceship _autonomization   0 5 3,17 
Total_SCORE_NPM_acquaintanceship   2 25 14,67 
Mean_SCORE_NPM_acquaintanceship   0,4 5 2,93 
          
Reliability Statistics Cronbach's Alpha 0,761     
 
On average party leaders evaluate their NPM acquaintanceship as ‘good’ (value 2.92), this is not as 
negative or limited as could be expected from previous, mostly qualitative research. Besides, party 
leaders in Flemish local councils indicate to be more familiar with the municipal management team and 
the concepts of autonomization and budgetownership. Paired sample T tests between the means of the 
5 different items show that only the difference between autonomization and management team and 
between internal control and management control are not statistically significant at the 5% level (see 
figure 7 in appendix). The value of 0,76 for Cronbach’s Alpha demonstrates a good ‘construct’, and 
reveals that the five elements are together measuring the same element, NPM acquaintanceship. 
 
The independent variables : Determinants of NPM score 
A linear regression analysis is performed on the dependent variable, the mean of the NPM 
acquaintanceship score. The model is fully illustrated in Figure 4 
Model= Ymean_SCORE_NPM_ACQUAINTANCESHIP=β0+β1EXP+β2EDU_ECONOMY+β3OPP/MAJ+β4CUMUL+β5PROF.USE+β6LN_ 
population+ ε 
Figure 4: regression model  
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Hypothesis Variable References Measure Source of 
data 
Expected 
sign 
 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Hood (1995) 
Leroy (2011) 
Anessi-Pessina, 
Nasi & Steccolini 
(2008) 
Askim (2007 & 
2008) 
NPM acquaintanceship party 
leaders : 
Mean of scores on each item 
(5 point likert scale)(NPM):  
- budget controllership 
- municipal managementteam 
- autonomization 
- management control and 
policy cycle 
- internal control 
Survey 
council party 
leaders (N= 
363)  
 
 
1 Experience Askim (2008) 
(Guérin & 
Kerrouche 2008)  
De Groot et al. 
(2010) 
Melkers & 
Willoughby 
(2005) 
 
 
Years in council (EXP) 
 
Survey 
council party 
leaders (N= 
363)  
 
 
Cannot be 
signed a 
priori 
2 Economic 
education 
Bochel & Bochel 
(2010) 
Verhelst et 
al.(2011) 
Askim (2007, 
2008) 
Guérin & 
Kerrouche (2008) 
De Groot et al. 
(2010) 
Melkers & 
Willoughby 
(2005) 
Weekers et al. 
(2007) 
(Brusca 1997) 
Dummy for economic 
education (economics, 
applied economics, 
commercial school, tax, 
banking, marketing, 
commercial science, 
management, insurance, ...) 
vs not (EDU_ECONOMY) 
Survey 
council party 
leaders (N= 
363)  
 
Positive  
3 Formal 
position 
 Dummy for opposition or 
majority (OPP/MAJ) 
Flemish 
agency for 
internal affair, 
database 
local 
mandates 
Positive for 
opposition 
4 Multiple 
office 
holding  
 
Weekers et al. 
(2007) 
Askim (2008) 
 
Dummy for combination of 
political mandates 
(international, national, 
regional, province level or 
executive local mandate) vs 
not (CUMUL) 
Belgian 
Bulletin of 
Acts, Orders 
and Decrees 
 
Positive for 
cumul 
5 Businesslike 
background  
Anessi-Pessina, 
Nasi & Steccolini 
(2008) 
(Brusca 1997) 
Askim (2008) 
Dummy for professional use 
of financial information vs not 
(PROF.USE) 
Survey 
council party 
leaders (N= 
363)  
 
Positive for 
prof. use 
CONTROL 
VARIABLE 
 (size) 
 
 
 
Anessi-Pessina, 
Nasi & Steccolini 
(2008) 
Population (natural logarithm 
of population in municipality 
2011)  
(LN_population) 
Belgian 
Federal 
Public 
Service 
Economy 
2011 
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Figure 5: Results of the regression analysis 
 
ANOVA: Dependent Variable: mean SCORE_NPM_acquaintanceship  
  
Model   Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 419,435 6 69,906 4,689 0,000 
  Residual 5306,896 356 14,907     
  Total 5726,331 362       
Regression   
Unstandardized 
Coefficients   
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
    B Std. Error Beta     
1 (Constant) 11,456 3,612   3,172 0,002 
  EXPERIENCE 0,05 0,025 0,102 1,982 0,048 
  OPP/MAJ 1,29 0,417 0,161 3,093 0,002 
  PROF.USE 0,931 0,434 0,115 2,145 0,033 
  CUMUL 1,319 0,704 0,098 1,874 0,062 
  EDU_ECONOMY 0,355 0,503 0,038 0,706 0,481 
  LN_population 0,132 0,369 0,018 0,357 0,721 
              
              
  R R Square         
  ,271a 0,073         
              
 
In the analyses of the results it is fruitful to remember that the first hypothesis related to party leaders’ 
experience. Our results reveal a positive influence of experience on party leaders’ NPM 
acquaintanceship. The longer party leaders are council members, the better they are acquainted with 
NPM concepts. 
The second hypothesis on the impact of opposition versus majority turns out contradictory to what we 
expected. Party leaders belonging to the majority have a better knowledge of applied NPM concepts in 
Flemish municipal councils than opposition leaders. Maybe they are closer to the College of mayor and 
aldermen and consequently have a certain knowledge advantage? They could also be more involved 
with the operational activities and service delivery in the municipality.  
The third hypothesis about professional use of financial information is confirmed in our results. Party 
leaders using financial information for professional reasons are better positioned to be more acquainted 
with businesslike concepts and tools. 
The fourth hypothesis about the positive impact of multiple office holding also corroborates with our 
expectations, although the results are only supported at the 10% significance level. The combination of 
different political mandates promotes familiarity with businesslike concepts and tools used in Flemish 
municipalities. 
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Finally, the fifth variable about economic education and the control variable are both statistically not 
significant. There is neither an effect of economic education of party leaders nor of the size of the 
municipality on their NPM acquaintanceship. 
However, in interpreting the results we should be cautious for correlations (see figure 6 in appendix) 
between the dependent variables. This certainly requires further statistical testing. Preliminary tests 
reveal that professional use of financial information is most relevant for politicians without economic 
education and that multiple office holding is most relevant for opposition members in explaining their 
NPM acquaintanceship.  
 
Conclusions (to be completed) 
NPM reforms of local government have attempted to sensibilize local politicians for the NPM doctrine. 
Concerning party leaders we could conclude that they are in general well acquainted with applied NPM 
concepts in Flemish municipalities, although there are significant differences between the five measured 
concepts. 
Three of the five hypotheses are accepted as expected with only the hypothesis on formal political role 
showing the opposite sign. Number of years in council, being a party leader of the majority, professional 
use of financial information and the combination of different political mandates positively influence party 
leaders acquaintanceship with NPM concepts in Flemish municipalities. 
Issues for further research could certainly include the adding of other predictors to increase the 
explained variability in the model or extending the research to all councillors. 
 
  


Appendix 
Figure 5: Descriptives for all variables in the regression model: 
 
  
Descriptive Statistics 
        
    N 363 Minimum Maximum Mean 
DV mean_SCORE_NPM_acquaintanceship   0,4 5 2,93 
H 1 EXPERIENCE   0,1 41 12,00 
  
    Frequency Percent   
H 2 OPP/MAJ opposition 202 55,60%   
  
  majority 161 44,40%   
  
          
H 3 PROF.USE no 147 40,50%   
  
  yes 216 59,50%   
  
          
H 4 CUMUL no 328 90,40%   
  
  yes 35 9,60%   
  
          
H 5 EDU_ECONOMY no 280 77,10%   
  
  yes 83 22,90%   
Control LN_population   7,67 11,67 9,73 
 
Figure 6: Correlations 
non-
parametric 
correlations 
               
     EXPERIENCE OPP/MAJ PROF.USE CUMUL EDU_ECONOMY LN_population 
Spearman's 
rho 
EXPERIENCE  1           
  OPP/MAJ  -0,044 1         
  PROF.USE  0,074 0,014 1       
  CUMUL  0,1 ,197** 0,041 1     
  EDU_ECONOMY  0,01 -0,024 ,275** -0,022 1   
  LN_population   -0,029 -0,032 0,091 -0,031 0,01 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Figure 7: Paired sample T test between 5 components of NPM_acquaintanceship_score 
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